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ABSTRACT 
On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and 
the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian 
population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the 
United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at 
the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the 
military  instrument  was  intended  to  generate  the  desired  political  effects.  The  paper 
argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of 
humanitarian  deterrence:  the  threat  of  military  force  is  used  to  discourage  potential 
spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning 
of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems 
to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-
strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the 
operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the 
political ambitions would have suggested. 
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1  INTRODUCTION
1 
In the course of 2008, the European Union (EU) launched a military operation in eastern 
Chad  and  the  northeast  of  the  Central  African  Republic  (CAR),  codenamed  EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA.
2 On the one hand, this paper will provide a detailed overview of the planning 
process of this operation. How did we get from the political decision-making process to the 
arrival  of  a  sizeable,  multinational  force  in  the  middle  of  the  desert,  thousands  of 
kilometres away, several months later? On the other hand, this paper analyses the military 
strategy of the operation – i.e. how the operation intended to achieve the desired political 
effect through the (threatened) use of military force.
3 Planning and strategy are intimately 
interlinked. In a general sense, planning is looking into the future and mitigating the course 
of future events through policy measures. In the context of a military operation, this is 
precisely what strategy is about. It is in the planning phase of an operation that political 
and military affairs meet. Policymakers set the aims and allocate the resources, whereas 
the  military  constitutes  the  instrument  to  implement  the  chosen  policy.  Strategy  is  the 
nexus where all this comes together. It encompasses the political debate over ends and 
means as well as the military discussion over how these can be linked together in a causal 
framework of action and effect. At the level of the analytical framework, therefore, the 
focus of this study is on the political-strategic level of the EU institutions and the military-
strategic level of the Operation Headquarters (OHQ) level.
4 
This paper cannot hope to cover all issues relevant to crisis management in Chad in detail. 
It can only briefly introduce the conflict in Chad itself. The role of the United Nations (UN) 
in managing the regional conflict will be mentioned insofar as necessary to understand the 
role EUFOR plays in the broader efforts of the international community. In the same vein, 
this paper does not venture into the tactical level on the ground. It will not discuss at 
length the practical details that the EUFOR soldiers struggle with on a daily basis. This is 
not  to  say  that  these  various  issues  do  not  merit  discussion.  The  main  interest  here, 
however, is to dissect the planning process of EUFOR at political-strategic and military-
strategic levels in order to gain an understanding of how the operation intended to achieve 
its objectives. 
                                                 
1 This paper is entirely based on open source, non-classified information and material gathered during 
a series of 18 research interviews with diplomatic and military officials conducted in the period July-
October 2008. All interviews were held under Chatham House rule, i.e. based on the understanding 
that all received information could be used freely but without revealing the identity or position of the 
person  interviewed.  Next  to  the  interviewees,  without  whom  this  project  would  have  been 
impossible, the author wishes to thank Sven Biscop from the Egmont Institute and Eva Gross from the 
IES as well as a number of officials from the Belgian armed forces for their instructive comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
2 In this paper the shorthand ‘EUFOR’ will be used to refer to EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Whenever there can 
exist any confusion with other EU operations the full names will be used. 
3 Although there exist heated semantic discussions about the concept of strategy (see Strachan 2005 
and Biscop 2007), this discussion uses the word in the narrow military sense coined by Clausewitz 
1976 and developed by, inter alia, Gray 1999. 
4 In terms of the levels of analysis, this paper will follow the definitions offered by the EU Concept for 
Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level. Herein the political-strategic level is located at 
the Brussels institutions, the military-strategic level at the OHQ, the operational level at the Force 
HQ (FHQ) and the tactical level at the component HQ. The distinction between military-strategic and 
operational levels is somewhat confusing and can be disputed on historical as well as theoretical 
grounds (cf. Strachan 2005). 4    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
The  relevance  of  this  research,  consequently,  lies  in  enhancing  the  understanding  the 
usefulness and limitations of military operations in the toolkit of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP). Contrary to the well-developed body of work focussing on how to 
manage the transition from conflict to peace,
5 the paper zooms in on the issue of military 
strategy in crisis response operations. EUFOR, for that matter, is the most recent, longest 
and largest autonomous military operation the EU has conducted so far. Considering the 
setting, both in terms of geography and the conflict background, a convincing case can be 
made that it is the most challenging and complex operation of the EU to date. In that 
sense, this paper gives an update of where the ESDP stands in developing the machinery for 
conducting  military  operations.  The  case  study  of  EUFOR  then  sheds  light  on  how  the 
translation from the political aims into military reality in one particular setting can look 
like, and by what problems this process it can be plagued. 
In a nutshell, this paper argues that the procedurally well-developed ESDP planning system 
in  the  case  of  EUFOR  suffered  from  a  mismatch  in  expectations  between  the  political-
strategic and military-strategic level. On the political level, EUFOR was motivated by a 
variety of considerations. Most EU member states were not wiling to devote substantial 
resources to the operation, but consented to what was essentially a French-driven initiative 
as long as some political restraints were met (i.e. impartiality and limited duration). The 
lowest common denominator in terms of mission objectives was to contribute to a Safe and 
Secure Environment (SASE). Within this political context, the planning of the operation at 
the military-strategic level resulted in an operational design based on the use deterrence 
for  humanitarian  purposes.  The  threat  of  military  force  would  be  used  to  discourage 
potential spoilers from engaging in any action that would undermine the security of the 
civilian  population.  The  military  planning  system  performed  well  in  the  face  of  major 
conceptual  and  practical  hurdles  that  can  be  labelled  under  the  heading  of  ‘friction’. 
Planning assumptions were uncertain, objectives were vague, no end-state was defined, 
the  force  generation  suggested  problems  in  political  credibility,  and  multinational 
command  and  control  arrangements  were  characteristically  difficult.  Within  these 
parameters,  an  operation  plan  was  produced  for  coping  with  a  complex  conflict 
environment.  However, this process implied a sense of realism about the limited role that 
EUFOR could play that unavoidably stands in contrast with grand political expectations. 
The structure of the discussion looks as follows. The first section describes the context of 
the operation. This includes a short introduction to the multi-layered conflict environment. 
It subsequently discusses the distinct roles played by other major players: the UN in charge 
of managing the regional conflict and France in its national role as former colonial power. 
The second section details the planning process of EUFOR. It starts by briefly introducing 
the  ESDP  operational  planning  process.  It  subsequently  discusses  the  political-strategic 
debate  in  Brussels  about  whether  to  do  the  operation  and  for  what  purpose.  This  is 
complemented by an overview of the operational design on the military-strategic level. An 
overview of the highly politicised force generation process closes the second section. In the 
third section, the overall military strategy of ‘humanitarian deterrence’ is analysed from a 
conceptual perspective. It is discussed how the notion of deterrence can be framed in a 
context  of  expeditionary  crisis  management.  The  fourth  section  draws  together  various 
problematic issues in the planning process under the Clausewitzian concept of friction. It 
gives a non-exhaustive overview of some aspects in the operational planning that are highly 
                                                 
5 E.g. Paris 2004. Alexander Mattelaer       5 
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2  BACKGROUND 
2.1  The Multilayered Conflict in Chad and the CAR 
In the east of Chad and the northeast of the CAR, around 240,000 refugees from Darfur 
region  in  the  neighbouring  Sudan  and  a  rapidly  rising  number  (170,000  by  mid-2007)  of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) flocked together in camps after having been uprooted by 
violence and generalised insecurity. Contrary to the misunderstanding that the situation in 
Chad  is  no  more  than  a  simple  spill-over  from  the  war  in  Darfur,  the  conflict  context 
underlying  this  insecurity  and  corresponding  population  movements  can  be  qualified  as 
multilayered and highly complex.
6 For analytical purposes, we can distinguish between (i) a 
multitude of local conflicts between various groups in areas that historically have known 
practically no effective governance, (ii) the various national conflicts for power that take 
place  inside  these  states  and  (iii)  the  permanently  ongoing  confrontation  between  the 
states in the region, notably Chad and Sudan. It is important to keep in mind that all these 
conflicts  occur  simultaneously  and  consequently  mutually  affect  each  other.  This 
omnipresence of armed activities fuels a systemic cycle of non-governance, criminality and 
impunity.  
In order to understand the security situation in the area it is useful to start at the local 
level. The Sahelian countries of Sudan, Chad and the CAR share borders drawn by former 
colonial powers that bear no relation to the ethnic demography of the region. Chad and the 
CAR  can  be  qualified  among  the  poorest  countries  in  the  world.  This  leaves  state 
authorities with little resources to effectively govern their large territories. Demographical 
factors coupled to an intense competition for agricultural land, food and water lead to the 
widespread existence of conflict between local tribes. This level of violent conflict resides 
below national politics and can be interpreted as a struggle for survival in an extremely 
harsh environment. It is nearly impossible to draw a clear distinction between tribal fights 
on the one hand and criminality and banditry on the other. 
These small local conflicts exist alongside politically inspired rebellions. The regimes of 
Idriss  Déby  in  N’Djamena  (Chad),  François  Bozizé  in  Bangui  (CAR)  and  Omar  al-Bashir 
(Sudan) all face a multitude of rebel insurgencies. Historically speaking, insurgency comes 
close to being a permanent feature of politics in the Sahel. Chad has been riddled by civil 
wars most of the time since it became independent from France in 1960. In fact, not a 
single Chadian Head of State since independence acquired his position through non-violent 
means.
7 Although these insurgencies are often portrayed as a simple confrontation between 
the Christian-African, agricultural south and the Arabic, nomadic north, their origin lies 
more in the socio-economic and political marginalisation of the peripheral regions of the 
country.
8  Furthermore,  the  limited  ability  of  the  state  authorities  to  provide  effective 
governance over the entire territory, especially the lack of an effective police and legal 
system, provides an ideal breeding ground for rebel movements dissatisfied with the status 
quo.  The  trigger  to the  current rebellions  in Chad  was the decision of president  Déby in 
                                                 
6 For in-depth analysis, see International Crisis Group 2008. 
7 Handy 2008. 
8 Prunier 2007a; 2008. Alexander Mattelaer       7 
     
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Chad and planned EUFOR positions
9 
2004  to  amend  the  constitution  and  to  run  for  a  third  term.
10  The  ensuing  political 
alienation revitalised armed rebellion as means to express political grievances. Yet it is also 
crucial to bear in mind the fractious nature of this opposition to Déby. The various rebel 
groups do not form a coherent force and are united only in their opposition to the current 
regime. The hard core of fighters with refuge on the Sudanese side of the border reportedly 
                                                 
9 Based on UN map N° 3788 Rev. 7. 
10 Handy 2008. 8    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
numbers  between  3,000  and  5,000  men  armed  with  machine  guns  and  Toyota  pick-up 
trucks.  They  pose  a  considerable  threat  to  the  regimes  in  power  as  the  regular  armed 
forces, though numerically superior, are of limited effectiveness.
11 While these armed rebel 
groups have no interest in targeting the civilian population in Chad, they need to sustain 
their operations by ‘living off the land’, which often comes down to looting and preying on 
the civilian population. 
It is commonly accepted that the existence of a safe haven in a neighbouring country is of 
tremendous value for a rebel movement or insurgency. The highly porous Chadian-Sudanese 
border in this light seems like a recipe for trouble. It constitutes a remote and inhospitable 
area over which state authorities never had much control, with tribal affiliations ranging 
across the border in both directions. In 1990, the Chadian president Déby staged his own 
coup on N’Djamena from within Darfur. Historically, Déby’s ensuing regime was dependent 
on support from France and Sudan.
12 When the war in Darfur in western Sudan erupted in 
2003, Déby originally supported the Sudanese crackdown on the Darfuri rebels. But as many 
of the Darfur insurgents belonged to Déby’s own tribe, the erosion of popular support for 
his  own  regime  forced  him  to  distance  himself  from  Sudan.  As  the  rebels  from  Darfur 
increasingly started using eastern Chad as their operating base and opposition against Déby 
rose, the situation slid into a condition of proxy warfare. Both governments accuse each 
other of – and are generally believed to be – arming rebel factions and offering safe havens 
on their territories, which has led to regular cross-border raids. 
2.2  Regional Conflict Management by the UN 
International involvement in the regional crisis started in the aftermath of the outbreak of 
the war in Darfur, and has taken many different shapes since then. The African Union (AU) 
undertook the first peacekeeping efforts in Darfur with the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). As 
this relatively small operation rapidly acquired a reputation of ineffectiveness, Resolution 
1769  of  the  UN  Security  Council  transformed  AMIS  into  the  AU-UN  Hybrid  Operation  in 
Darfur  (UNAMID).  The  authorized  troop  strength  was  correspondingly  raised  from  AMIS’s 
7,700  to  26,000  (military  and  police  contributions  combined).  At  present,  however,  it 
seems that UNAMID, currently 10,000 strong, is plagued by much the same problems as 
AMIS. 
Already in 2006, when the UN first contemplated taking over AMIS, the establishment of a 
multidimensional  presence  in  Chad  and  the  CAR  was  already  evoked.
13  From  a  military 
perspective, it made little sense to try and stabilise a given area, when the proxy war could 
continue across the border. As there seemed to be a relatively positive dynamic in Chad in 
the first half of 2007, the UN Secretariat came up with the plan of complementing the 
UNAMID deployment with an operation in eastern Chad. In the first outline of the plan, this 
multidimensional  presence  would  encompass  three  components:  civilian,  police  and 
military.
14 The civilian pillar would become active in the domain of civil affairs, rule of law, 
human rights, humanitarian liaison and public information. The police pillar would involve 
some 300 international UN police officers training, mentoring and/or advising Chadian and 
CAR police staff in exercising a minimum level of order in and around the refugee camps. 
                                                 
11 Seibert 2007, 15.  
12 Prunier 2007b. 
13 Cf. UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006). 
14 UN 2007a. Alexander Mattelaer       9 
     
 
The military pillar, finally, would provide an umbrella of relative security under which the 
UN  and  the  humanitarian  aid  community  could  achieve  their  objectives.  In  the  first 
estimations, such a military force would involve an expanded brigade (some 6,000 troops) 
with a significant air component for enhanced mobility (option A) or an infantry division 
(10,900 troops) which would rely more on infantry presence and less on air mobility (option 
B).  
Early  on,  it  became  clear  that  Chadian  president  Déby  was  unfavourable  to  a  military 
presence  by  the  UN.
15  It  was  in  this  context  that  EUFOR,  under  French  lead,  would 
eventually come to serve as a politically more palatable alternative to a military operation 
under  UN  flag.  In  the  light  of  the  historical  relationship  between  France  and  Chad  (cf. 
infra), the Chadian regime viewed a French-led force with less suspicion than an operation 
run by the UN. Subsequent developments led to a situation were the EU operation would 
provide the military security umbrella, whereas the political and humanitarian pillar would 
work  through  various  channels  (the  UN,  the  European  Commission  and  their  various 
representatives  and  the  NGO  community).  Finally,  the  UN  Department  of  Peacekeeping 
Operations would run the police mission MINURCAT (United Nations Mission in the Central 
African Republic and Chad). MINURCAT would be composed of 300 police and 50 military 
liaison officers and would be tasked to train and advise elements of the Police tchadienne 
pour la protection humanitaire (relabelled into the Détachement intégré de sécurité) and 
to liaise with all actors involved. This Chadian police force was intended to become 850 
strong in order to provide security in the refugee and IDP camps.  
Once this multidimensional presence moved into deployment phase, it soon became clear 
that  the  UN  police  mission  MINURCAT  was  much  slower  in  becoming  operational  than 
EUFOR. The delay in the deployment of the Chadian gendarmerie units was consequently 
even bigger. Small-scale violence and banditry that needed to be tackled by police units 
rather than EUFOR’s attack helicopters thus continued even when EUFOR was in place.
16 In 
what  follows,  it  should  therefore  be  kept  in  mind  that  EUFOR  plays  but  one  part  in  a 
broader scheme, i.e. that of providing a military security umbrella in Chad and the CAR. If 
anyone, it is the UN that tries to manage the regional conflict. The UN does so with the 
various  instruments  it  has  at  its  disposal  but  it  also  faces  daunting  challenges.  These 
problems  reach  from  military  overstretch  to  the  political  unwillingness  that  can  be 
detected on the side of the local governments – who, after all, remain the primary actors in 
this conflict. 
2.3  The Double Role of France in Context 
France played a key role in putting the situation in Chad on the agenda of the EU. For this 
reason,  it  is  well  warranted  to  highlight  some  elements  of  immediate  relevance  in  the 
historical  relationship  between  France  and  Chad.  From  independence  in  1960  onwards, 
Chad  –  like  most  other  former  French  colonies  –  signed  various  military  assistance 
agreements with France. These bilateral agreements allowed France to keep military bases 
in  the  territory,  as  well  as  have  rights  to  transit  and  over-flight.  In  return  France 
guaranteed external territorial security to its colonies and would consider all requests for 
assistance  in  the  face  of  insurgencies  and  coup  attempts.  In  addition,  France  provided 
equipment, training and advice to the Chadian armed forces. On several occasions during 
                                                 
15 UN 2007a, § 33. 
16 Oxfam 2008. 10    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
the Cold War, France launched military interventions in Chad to maintain stability or keep 
an embattled regime in power.
17 In the context of Chadian-Libyan tensions, France in 1986 
deployed  Operation  Epervier,  a  military  task  force  with  a  heavy  air  component.  It  has 
remained stationed in Chad until the present day. 
In the spring of 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy won the French presidential election and assumed 
office on 16 May. Bernard Kouchner is appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who in 
the past had frequently voiced grave concern about the regional crisis around Darfur. On 21 
May 2007, all foreign offices of EU member states receive word from Paris about a proposal 
to do something in eastern Chad. In the words of one interviewee, “Kouchner played a 
crucial  role  in  pushing  for  the  deployment  of  EUFOR”.  Against  the  background  of  the 
historical relationship between Chad and France, the eventual EU operation would come to 
play a limited role in a more complex scheme of French Africa policy. The humanitarian 
efforts in the area enjoyed widespread support in the international community, making the 
UN  and  the  EU  the  obvious  policy  vehicles.  More  sensitive  issues,  such  as  military 
assistance, would necessarily remain a part of the bilateral French-Chadian relationship. In 
this framework, EUFOR would simply be deployed alongside Epervier. Each operation would 
have its own mission description.  
The  complexity  of  this  situation  became  clearest  when  a  coalition  of  rebels  attacked 
N’Djamena  on  2  February  2008.  Several  analysts  suggest  it  was  precisely  the  perceived 
ambiguity about EUFOR’s role that triggered the rebels to attack at the time EUFOR was 
starting its deployment: even the humanitarian work and associated stability was expected 
to benefit Déby more than it would the rebels. The attack on N’Djamena meant that Paris 
was  caught  between  two  sides.  On  the  one  hand  there  was  pressure  from  its  European 
partners not to compromise EUFOR’s imposed neutrality by intervening on behalf of Déby. 
On the other hand there were Déby’s requests for assistance, which France had honoured in 
the past – most recently in 2006. As a result, actions were seen on both fronts. Firstly, 
French  Epervier  forces  most  likely  provided  indirect  support  (i.e.  intelligence,  logistical 
support  and  advice)  to  the  Chadian  armed  forces  that  were  fighting  the  rebels,  but 
refrained from entering into direct combat themselves.
18 Through simultaneous lobby work 
France obtained the approval of the UN Security Council for a direct intervention if this 
would  have  been  required  in  the  near  future.
19  Secondly,  the  French  EUFOR  Force 
Commander  underlined  in  straightforward  terms  that  EUFOR  would  not  meddle  in  the 
conflict between Déby and the rebels but was only there to protect the civilian population 
and the UN. 
                                                 
17 Collelo 1988a. 
18 Arteaga 2008; Handy 2008. 
19 Le Monde 2008. Alexander Mattelaer       11 
     
 
 
3  THE PLANNING PROCESS OF EUFOR 
With this background in mind, it is time to turn to the focus of this discussion, namely the 
planning of EUFOR. The central question is how EUFOR was intended to achieve its political 
objectives. In order to structure the discussion, we will follow the different steps in the 
planning process. The first subsection therefore briefly outlines how this process looks like 
in theory. The second subsection focuses on the initiation phase at the political-strategic 
level  in  Brussels.  The  third  subsection  sketches  the  lines  along  which  the  operational 
planning was conducted at the military-strategic level. The focus here lies on how the OHQ 
interpreted its political guidance and conceptually developed an operational design. The 
fourth subsection deals with the force generation process, where the political-strategic and 
military-strategic levels met. 
3.1  The ESDP Operational Planning Process 
In order to meet the complex challenge of planning operations, military institutions have 
developed a body of doctrine and procedures. The ESDP structures are not different in this 
regard: a planning process has been developed and is regularly revised. As most EU member 
states  are  also  NATO  members,  ESDP  planning  procedures  are  very  strongly  inspired  or 
simply copied from the available NATO doctrine. This subsection sketches a broad outline 
of how the operational planning process works in the case of military ESDP operations.
20  
 
Figure 2. Operational Planning Disciplines 
As  outlined  in  Figure  1,  operational  planning  is  divided  into  two  major  consecutive 
disciplines: advance planning and crisis response planning. Advance planning relates to the 
planning for possible security threats. In the ESDP framework, this can assume the form of 
either generic planning (drawing up catalogues of what capabilities are available for ESDP 
operations and comparing those with those that are required for pre-identified standard 
scenarios)
21  or  strategic  contingency  planning  (ongoing  monitoring  of  the  security 
environment and drawing up non-detailed contingency plans to inform political decision-
making). Once the political level, embodied by the 27 national ambassadors sitting in the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC), decides that “EU action is appropriate”, the switch 
is made from advance planning to crisis response planning. This concerns the development 
of a response to an actual crisis, the end result being a detailed Operation Plan (OPLAN) 
ready  for  execution.  Crisis  response  planning  is  itself  a  multi-layered  process.  At  the 
                                                 
20 The crucial documents in this regard are the Suggestions for Crisis Management Procedures, the EU 
Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level and the EU OHQ Standing Operating 
Procedures. 
21 Giegerich (2008, 16-22) offers a detailed description of this branch of planning. 
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political-strategic level, political authorities in consecutive steps define the broad outlook 
of the operation. At the various military levels below – military-strategic, operational and 
tactical  –  an  iterative  process  is  started  in  which  the  guidance  from  the  level  above  is 
analysed and translated into plans of increasing levels of detail. 
The  first  step  in  the  political-strategic  initiation  of  crisis  response  planning  is  the 
development of a crisis management concept (CMC). This is a policy document agreed by 
the PSC containing a political and military assessment of the situation. As such it is a multi-
pillar document outlining the role of the different instruments the EU has at its disposal for 
reacting to the crisis. The Council Secretariat (DG E VIII), the EU Military Staff and Military 
Committee  (EUMS  and  EUMC)  together  provide  the  military  input  to  the  debate.  After 
adoption by the PSC it is validated by the Council of Ministers under the GAERC format 
(General  Affairs  and  External  Relations  Council).  Following  CMC  approval,  the  EUMS  is 
tasked  with  the  development  of  Military  Strategic  Options  (MSOs).  These  are  possible 
outlines of military action designed to achieve the politico-military objectives outlined in 
the CMC. They outline the military course of action and required resources. These options 
are prioritised by the EUMS and commented upon by the EU Military Committee (EUMC). 
Subsequently, they are put forward to the PSC for debate and the GAERC validates the 
chosen option. After this the Joint Action can be produced: a legal act by which the Council 
formally  establishes  the  operation,  appoints  the  operational  commanders  and  OHQ  and 
fixes a reference amount for the common costs inherent to the operation.
22 The EUMC, 
supported  by  the  EUMS,  translates  the  Joint  Action  into  an  Initiating  Military  Directive 
(IMD).  This  documents  provides  military  guidance  for  the  Operation  Commander.  This 
process is summarised in Figure 3 below.
23 
 
Figure 3. Crisis response planning at the political-strategic level 
From this point onwards, the various headquarters (OHQ at the military-strategic and FHQ 
at the operational and tactical level) can kick into action. In terms of doctrine, the EU OHQ 
Standard  Operating  Procedures  essentially  follow  the  NATO  Guidelines  for  Operational 
Planning. The first step is a detailed analysis of the guidance given by the level above 
(orientation phase). Secondly, different courses of action are developed and compared with 
one another (concept development). Thirdly, the preferred course is developed into a plan 
(plan  development).  Fourthly,  plans  receive  regular  reviews  when  they  are  put  into 
practice  (plan  review).  At  the  military-strategic  level  of  the  OHQ,  the  key  documents 
                                                 
22 The notion of operational commanders refers to the Operation Commander who is responsible for 
the overall design of the operation and functions as the politico-military interface in the planning and 
conduct of the operation, and the Force Commander who directly commands the forces deployed on 
the ground in theatre.  
23 Based on the EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic Level. 
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produced in this process are thus the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operation 
Plan  (OPLAN).  The  CONOPS  is  a  concise  statement  of  how  the  Operation  Commander 
intends to fulfil his mission whereas the OPLAN is the highly detailed script of the entire 
operation.  Both  the  CONOPS  and  the  OPLAN  are  approved  by  the  EUMC  and  politically 
endorsed by the PSC and the Council. This process is visualised by Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4. Crisis response planning at military-strategic level 
In parallel to the process of plan development, but separate from it, runs the process of 
force  generation.
24  Alongside  the  CONOPS,  the  Operation  Commander  produces  a 
provisional Statement of Requirement indicating the means he needs in order to be able to 
fulfil the mission. In a series of force generation conferences – a process not limited in time 
–  the  participating  member  states  pledge  assets  and  capabilities  for  the  operation  in  a 
dynamic of supply and demand. Once plan development is completed, the OPLAN validated 
and  all  the  essential  (mission-critical)  elements  of  the  Statement  of  Requirement  are 
fulfilled, the Council of Ministers can formally launch the operation. 
Before turning to the case of EUFOR, a brief note should be made about the EU’s capacity 
in  strategic  contingency  planning.  While  the  EU  Military  Staff  was  already  tasked  with 
strategic advance planning since its inception, in practice it was only allowed to do so in 
specific cases once the decision that ‘EU action is appropriate’ had been taken. The reason 
for this is that the Council does not want to signal future action too soon. Of course, the 
problem with this set-up is that this very decision about appropriateness cannot be taken 
without a basic assessment of the situation and what can possibly be done about it. At the 
informal EU defence ministerial in Wiesbaden in March 2007, it became clear that it was 
required  “to  get  the  first  bit  of  planning  right”.
25  Correspondingly,  at  the  GAERC  in 
November  2007  the  EUMS  received  wider  authority  to  engage  in  strategic  contingency 
planning as outlined above.
26 With regards to the timing, it should be kept in mind that this 
strategic contingency planning capability was not yet up and running when the discussions 
about a possible operation in Chad started. As a result, the planning for EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
started in a more ad hoc mode. 
 
                                                 
24 The reference document is the EU Concept for Force Generation. 
25 Summary of remarks by Javier Solana 2007. 
26 Council Conclusions on ESDP 2007, 6. 
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3.2  The Political-Strategic Initiation Phase of EUFOR 
As already indicated, the very first mentioning of the idea of conducting an ESDP operation 
in Chad can be found in a diplomatic cable the French ministry of foreign affairs sent to all 
other EU foreign ministries on 21 May 2007. For the German presidency this was clearly no 
priority, but the incoming Portuguese presidency put the proposal back on the agenda. The 
Council Secretariat and the Commission were tasked to propose a catalogue of possible 
actions. In the words of one official, this involved both “killing the stupid ideas” (such as a 
no fly zone or a humanitarian corridor) and “proposing something useful and coherent with 
the instruments we have”. A jointly drafted Options Paper was released the 13
th of July. In 
this document, the security dimension was especially emphasised, as this was felt to be the 
wish of  the  initiating member state.  At the GAERC of 23 July, the Council Secretariat was 
 
EUFOR Planning Milestones
27 
 
21 May 2007      France suggests an initiative for Chad 
13 July 2007      joint Council-Commission Options Paper 
23 July 2007      GAERC gives planning authority to Council Secretariat 
27 July   2007      PSC issues CMC tasker 
3 Sept 2007      OHQ pre-activation 
10 Sept 2007  PSC approves CMC and gives planning authority to Mont Valerien 
OHQ 
12 Sept 2007      Council approves CMC; MSO paper is released 
24 Sept 2007  indicative force generation conference; draft mission analysis 
brief reviewed 
25 Sept 2007      UN Security Council approves Resolution 1778 
4 Oct 2007      MSO 3 adopted 
15 Oct 2007      Council issues Joint Action; Operation Commander arrives in OHQ 
23 Oct 2007      Initiating Military Directive issued by EUMC 
8 Nov 2007      PSC adopts CONOPS 
9 Nov 2007      1
st force generation conference 
12 Nov 2007      Council adopts CONOPS 
11 Jan 2008      5
th and last force generation conference 
14 Jan 2008      Operation Commander presents draft OPLAN 
18 Jan 2008      Revised OPLAN released 
28 Jan 2008      Council accepts OPLAN and formally launches operation 
1-4 Feb 2008      UFDD-led rebel coalition attacks N’Djamena 
12 Feb 2008      EUFOR deployment restarts 
11 Mar 2008      Status of Forces Agreement signed 
15 Mar 2008      EUFOR reaches Initial Operating Capability 
17 Sept 2008      EUFOR reaches Full Operating Capability 
 
                                                 
27 Overview based on data collected through various interviews. Alexander Mattelaer       15 
     
 
 
given formal planning authority, and it was subsequently tasked by the PSC to prepare a 
Crisis Management Concept. In doing so, the Council staff could rely on preliminary work 
that had been done by the UN. Already in this period, a Joint Planning Group was formed in 
Paris,  drawing  on  the  French  national  HQ  (Centre  de  planification  et  de  conduite  des 
operations or CPCO). It was clear early on that France would offer its OHQ rather than run 
the operation from within the EU Cell in SHAPE (the military-strategic NATO HQ) or the 
Operations Centre in Brussels.  
In line with the view of the UN, the CMC outlined a multidimensional presence. In the 
political domain, the EU Special Representative for Sudan, Torben Brylle, would receive 
additional  authority  to  mediate  in  the  complex  regional  dynamic.  In  the  humanitarian 
domain,  the  Commission  would  pursue  its  long-term  efforts  under  the  Programme 
d’Accompagnement à la Paix. In the security domain, finally, the EU would undertake its 
own military effort to provide a security umbrella and financially support the UN’s efforts 
in  police  training.  The  embryonic  essence  of  the  military  mission  was  laid  out. 
Nevertheless, it would take until 12 September until the Council would accept the CMC. 
Inevitably, the debate over the CMC contained tough discussions about the motivations and 
logic behind the proposed operation. As one diplomat explained, the operation was sold to 
the national parliaments and the general public as a humanitarian operation – tasked to 
alleviate the humanitarian spill over from Darfur. In the closed debates, however, three 
motivating  factors  reportedly  linked  up  with  one  another.  First,  there  existed  a  French 
desire to do something in Chad. Rather than protecting Déby, this desire sprung from a fear 
of larger regional destabilisation – regional chaos expanding to Niger or even the Great 
Lakes region. A French diplomat put it as follows: “What we want in Chad is stability. The 
rebels  aren’t  any  better  than  Déby,  we  simply  wish  to  avoid  a  situation  of  continuous 
warfare  affecting  the  broader  region.”  Second  was  the  factor  that  the  PSC  had  been 
debating the crisis in Darfur for ages. The frustration of being powerless led to an attempt 
to try and do at least something about the regional aspect of the crisis. Paradoxically, one 
diplomat  noted,  the  member  states  most  vocal  about  Darfur  in  the  past  (the  UK  and 
Germany,  reportedly)  were  the  most  reticent  about  action.  Third  was  the  institutional 
factor. One year onwards from the EUFOR RD Congo mission and with the EU Battlegroups 
having become fully operational in January 2007, some felt it was time for a new military 
operation  to  foster  the  development  of  the  ESDP  as  a  crisis  management  tool.  In  this 
context the PSC debated a possible deployment of the Nordic Battlegroup into the eastern 
Congo as well. Chad soon emerged as another candidate, albeit not ideal for a battlegroup 
scenario.  
Overall,  several  interviews  conducted  with  personnel  from  various  permanent 
representations in Brussels concur with the analysis that different motivating factors were 
at  play  with  regard  to  the  Chad  operation.  There  was  a  certain  level  of  suspicion  with 
regard  to  the  French  agenda  in  the  debate.  As  a  result,  the  neutral  countries  (led  by 
Austria)  insisted  on  a  mandate  emphasising  the  neutrality  of  the  operation.  A 
representative of one of the neutral member states summed it up as follows:  
We know the French have certain national interests in Chad and that they 
are in it with a somewhat different agenda. But without the French nothing 
would happen at all. By and large, we believe the French are honest about 16    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
this and trying to do the right thing. At the European level, the operation 
was launched for many different reasons of varying importance – there is no 
single dominant motive. 
Nevertheless, the suspicion amongst some member states with regard to the French agenda 
never disappeared completely. It was felt that however well intentioned the operation, in 
the end it would serve French interests the most. The argument here was that the Chadian 
infrastructure (airports, roads, camps etc) would be renovated with EU funds while the EU 
as such would not remain engaged long-term, leaving France as the main beneficiary of the 
investment. In this context it should also be noted that the “EU action is appropriate”-
decision  was  never  formally  taken  in  the  case  of  EUFOR.  Instead,  the  CMC  tasker  was 
retroactively interpreted as such. Depending on one’s point of view, this can be read as an 
example of procedural flexibility or an attempt to push through a decision by stealth. 
Following the adoption of the CMC, the PSC gave planning authority to the French OHQ in 
the fortress of Mont Valerien, nearby Paris, and the EUMC issued a directive to the EUMS for 
the development of military strategic options. This process, however, had started on an 
informal basis already from the end of July onwards. While the OHQ had no commander 
yet,  from  mid-September  national  augmentees  were  sent  in  to  multinationalise  the 
command structure. The MSO directive itself was by and large resource-driven and defined 
in  quantitative  terms:  the  EUMS  was  asked  to  propose  broad  options  for  an  operation 
involving roughly 1, 2 or 4 battalions. Initially, the EUMS identified two major tasks: (i) to 
support the UN in training police for the refugee camps and providing aid and (ii) to protect 
the IDPs and the general population, as it was felt the UN made the refugees their primary  
 
Military Strategic Options EUFOR Tchad/RCA 
 
1. Support Chadian forces in providing security in the area of operations 
Required capabilities: 1 manoeuvre battalion 
Problem of impartiality: this minimal option increases dependency on host nation support 
 
2. Putting priority on the protection of MINURCAT (= primary focus) and then the rest 
Required capabilities: 3 manoeuvre battalions 
Gradual geographical expansion: Centre   South   North 
 
3. Two lines of operation: (i) supporting the UN deployment and (ii) protecting the civilian population 
in a wider area 
Required capabilities: 4 manoeuvre battalions 
Rapid reaction, all at once deployment 
 
4. Same as MSO 3 but with specific dispositions for the CAR (EUFOR role limited to mentoring) 
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consideration.
28 Eventually, the following set of options was put forward to the EUMC and 
the PSC, characterised in terms of the effects they would aim to achieve as well as the 
manner of deployment and the resources required.
29 
While these options were being developed and discussed, two related events took place. In 
Brussels, on the one hand, an informal force generation conference was held in parallel to 
the initiating planning phase. One defence counsellor described the event as “a disaster”: 
practically no meaningful contributions (apart from the French) were made. In total the 
offers only added up to about half of the required forces. In New York, on the other hand, 
the  UN  Security  Council  authorised  the  mandate  of  both  MINURCAT  and  EUFOR.  Acting 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council defined the mission assigned 
tasks as follows: for a period of one year from Initial Operating Capability onwards, being 
authorized to take all necessary measures, 
(i)   To  contribute  to  protecting  civilians  in  danger,  particularly 
refugees and displaced persons; 
(ii)  To  facilitate  the  delivery  of  humanitarian  aid  and  the  free 
movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the 
area of operations; 
(iii)  To  contribute  to  protecting  United  Nations  personnel,  facilities, 
installations and equipment and to ensuring the security and freedom of 
movement of its staff and United Nations and associated personnel;
30 
An earlier report by the UN Secretary-General had already excluded the possibility that the 
multidimensional presence would be involved in border control.
31 One of the preconditions 
for Déby’s acceptance of EUFOR and MINURCAT was that only Chadian gendarmes would be 
allowed inside the refugee and IDP camps.
32 It nearly goes without saying that in New York 
the  French  delegation  at  the  Security  Council  was  closely  involved  in  drafting  the 
resolution. Unsurprisingly, some EU member states more skeptical of the operation felt that 
a close link existed between Paris and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 
New York.  
In the discussion about the options paper, MSO 1 and MSO 4 were soon abandoned. The 
minimal footprint sketched in MSO 1 would increase the dependency on host nation support 
to such an extent that neutrality and impartiality would become impossible to guarantee. 
The monitoring approach offered by MSO 4 was felt to be a non-starter, proposed mainly in 
order to generate an illusion of choice. This left MSO 2 and MSO 3 which were largely seen 
as variants of the same idea: option two was more realistic from a political point of view, 
option three was ideal from a military perspective.
33 Notwithstanding serious doubts over 
its level of ambition, MSO 3 was adopted. Of course, this debate was not only about what 
                                                 
28 The impression at the EUMS was that the UN initially saw EUFOR as the military arm of their own 
operation, whereas the Europeans from the start wanted to put their own priorities as well, notably 
with regard to the IDP problem. As Kiszely (2008, 12) generalises, in multi-organisational campaigns 
“each line of operation tends to pride itself on its independence”. 
29 Information obtained through various interviews. 
30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007). 
31 UN 2007b, 5. 
32 Seibert 2007, 17. 
33 Ideal in terms of resources, that is. In terms of logistics, taking into account the limitations of local 
infrastructure, it is clear that a rapid full deployment would have been highly challenging. 18    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
effects the mission should seek, but also about the resources it would require – an aspect 
that would remain in the spotlight throughout the force generation process. In the run-up 
to the Joint Action establishing EUFOR, this led to serious disagreements over the reference 
amount for the common costs of the operation to be split between member states.
34 At 
first,  the  EUMS  suggested  an  amount  of  420  million  EUR  to  the  RELEX  group.  Through 
negotiations,  this  amount  was  reduced  to  99,2  million  EUR,  although  it  grew  again  to 
around 120 million EUR at the start of the operation in January 2008. 
On the 15
th of October, the Council produced the Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP – the legal 
act formally establishing the operation. In doing so, Mont Valérien was officially appointed 
as  the  EU  OHQ,  as  were  LtGen  Patrick  Nash  and  BGen  Jean-Philippe  Ganascia  as 
respectively Operation Commander and Force Commander. In terms of content, EUFOR was 
labelled as a military bridging operation, a concept developed earlier in the context of EU-
UN cooperation in crisis management. From the start, the expectation was created that the 
EU would conduct a mission for one year upon which the UN would take over with a mission 
of its own – even though no concrete arrangements for doing so were made. In accordance 
with Resolution 1778, it only stated that an evaluation of the need for a possible follow-up 
would be held six months after EUFOR achieved Initial Operating Capability. During the 
following week, the EUMC prepared the Initiating Military Directive, which translated the 
Joint Action into military guidance. This directive identified that the strategic objective of 
the  operation  should  be  to  contribute  to  a  Safe  and  Secure  Environment  (SASE).  The 
directive  also  imposed  constraints  (obligations)  as  well  as  restraints  (prohibitions):  the 
force should maintain an impartial and neutral posture and not become involved in the 
ongoing confrontation between Déby’s regime and the various rebel groups. As a result, 
from 23 October onwards, the military planning process could make a formal start.  
3.3  The Military-Strategic Operational Design of EUFOR 
3.3.1 The Orientation Phase 
By the time the Initiating Military Directive arrived in the Mont Valerien, a lot of effort had 
already gone into getting the EUFOR OHQ up and running. The OHQ had been pre-activated 
on  September  3
rd,  received  planning  authority  on  Sept  10
th  and  was  boosted  with 
augmentees a few days later.  The first task was to import all necessary information and 
expertise in the skeleton HQ structure. For this purpose, all factors having an influence on 
the  operational  planning  are  listed  in  a  so-called  Three  Column  Estimate  together  with 
their  implications  for  the  operations  and  corresponding  conclusions.  This  working 
document, which was already partially ready by September, effectively functioned as the 
way  to  familiarise  the  arriving  augmentees  with  the  dossier  and  formed  the  basis  for 
mission analysis. 
The three mission tasks were defined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1778 mandating 
EUFOR. The political-strategic objective was to contribute to a SASE. In military terms, this 
translated  into  two  objectives.  On  the  one  hand,  EUFOR  would  provide  security  to 
                                                 
34 The financial cost of a military ESDP operation is split into individual costs, i.e. pertaining to all 
distinct national contributions to the operation, and common costs that relate to the multinational 
backbone of the operation, such as preparatory missions, headquarters and infrastructure. Individual 
costs ‘lie where they fall’, i.e. each contributing state pays for itself, whereas common costs are 
financed jointly through the ATHENA mechanism, a Gross National Income-based distribution key. 
(Mattelaer 2007, 82-83). Alexander Mattelaer       19 
     
 
MINURCAT so that the UN could in turn do its job of training the police to provide security 
in  the  refugee  camps.  On  the  other  hand,  EUFOR  would  foster  a  sense  of  security  to 
encourage the return of IDPs. The strategic centre of gravity of EUFOR for drawing strength 
for achieving these objectives was its credibility. In the given context it was a formidable 
force  with  firepower  (both  of  its  infantry  personnel  and  the  availability  of  close  air 
support),  reconnaissance  capability  (allowing  it  to  see  threats  from  afar)  and  aerial 
mobility  (allowing  it  to  send  reinforcements  quickly  wherever  needed).  But  apart  from 
military capability and the Rules of Engagement to use it, the credibility was also based on 
the notion of impartiality. The determination to stay out of the struggle for power would 
give EUFOR complete independence of action – on the ground in Chad, it would not require 
anyone’s authorization to act. This in turn required adequate resources, deployment and 
sustainment in a distant and inhospitable theatre. As a result of these requirements, the 
vulnerability  of  EUFOR  lay  both  in  the  political  process  in  Brussels  and  in  the  logistical 
sustainment challenge in theatre. 
Already  in  the  orientation  phase,  however,  the  planners  had  to  tackle  the  two  major 
constraints imposed by the political-strategic level. On the one hand, the operation had to 
be neutral and impartial – terminology used by policymakers without being clearly defined. 
Although  semantically  related,  military  personnel  do  not  see  these  terms  as  synonyms. 
Neutrality is interpreted as not affecting the political situation at all, while impartiality is 
interpreted  as  applying  your  influence  in  an  even-handed  manner.  In  this  context, 
impartiality means reacting to threats to civilians or the UN no matter where the threat 
comes from whereas neutrality would mean not to interfere at all. In any case the politico-
strategic constraints meant that no clear-cut adversary was available. On the other hand, 
the political level had identified an end-date (the operation will last 12 months from Initial 
Operating  Capability  onwards)  rather  than  an  end-state  (the  operation  should  achieve 
objectives x,y and z). As the operational planning process is originally developed for high-
intensity combat operations, these constraints together with the tasks identified in the UN 
mandate and the nature of the conflict context itself brought the planners into uncharted 
waters. The terminology of operational planning, correspondingly, had to be stretched to 
its semantic limits. 
For  structuring  the  Opposing  Forces  (Opposing  forces)  situation,  the  planners  made 
recourse  to  the  concept  of  spoilers.
35  The  phrase  was  originally  coined  by  the  scholar 
Stephen Stedman and refers to  
leaders  and  parties  who  believe  that  peace  emerging  from  negotiations 
threatens  their  power,  worldview,  and  interests,  and  use  violence  to 
undermine attempts to achieve it.
36 
In the context of Chad and the CAR, all armed groups who could pose a military threat to 
SASE were labelled as spoilers. This included rebels, militias, bandits as well as government 
forces (for example in the hypothetical case of escalation of the proxy war between Chad 
and  Sudan  into  a  conventional  conflict).  One  can  differentiate  between  these  actors  in 
terms  of  their  aims  and  motives  and  correspondingly  lump  them  together  into  three 
                                                 
35 On a methodological level, it should be noted that the terminology of ‘opposing forces’ for this 
very reason is being abandoned in favour of ‘relevant forces’ or ‘parties in conflict’. This underlines 
the point that the complexity of operational planning increases dramatically with the vagueness of 
the mission. 
36 Stedman 1997, 5. 20    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
categories: (i) the Chadian rebels with the aim of overthrowing Déby, (ii) armed militias of 
tribal  nature  and  (iii)  CAR  rebels  and  bandits  of  Sudanese  origin.  What  these  three 
categories have in common is that they oppose the establishment of a SASE on the basis 
that  an  environment  riddled  with  criminality  and  impunity  suits  their  activities.  In  this 
sense,  the  use  of  the  spoiler  concept  allowed  an  application  of  the  ‘own  forces’  vs 
‘opposing  forces’  framework,  even  when  there  was  no  adversary  on  the  political  level: 
opposing forces are all potential threats to the UN and the civilian population. Of course, as 
the  spoiler  concept  functions  as  a  catch-all  formula,  this  complicates  Opposing  forces 
centre of gravity analysis.
37 Tactically, all groups could be analysed individually, but on the 
strategic level their centre of gravity remained a vacuum. On the operational level, one 
can  go  no  further  than  saying  that  all  spoilers  derive  their  strength  from  the  general 
impunity to conduct criminal activities. This leads to near infinite sustainment capability, 
but with vulnerable lines of communication. For this reason, strategic planners felt it was 
best to concentrate on their own centre of gravity. 
The absence of a clearly defined end-state constituted a second major problem. EUFOR was 
tasked  to  maintain  a  condition  (contribute  to  SASE)  for  a  pre-specified  duration  of  12 
months  rather  than  achieve  a  clearly  defined  outcome.  In  terms  of  operational  design, 
Lines of Operation could not converge towards an end-state or the defeat of an opposing 
forces centre of gravity.
38 As a result, EUFOR lines of operation ran parallel. The following 
four lines of operation were identified, with corresponding ‘decisive points’ (which were 
reportedly rather fuzzy than decisive). 
 
Figure 5. The four lines of operation 
In  terms  of  security,  EUFOR  would  deter  the  use  of  force  against  the  UN  presence, 
refugees, IDPs and the civilian population. In terms of logistics, it would sustain itself and 
guarantee its freedom of movement, improve transport infrastructure and contribute to the 
free  movement  of  MINURCAT.  Regarding  diplomacy,  it  would  open  up  lines  of 
communication to all actors and support mediation efforts wherever possible. The notion of 
                                                 
37 Centre of gravity analysis is a military methodology for analysing strengths and weaknesses of all 
conflict parties (cf. Eikmeier 2004). 
38 In operation design, decisive points are those from which a centre of gravity can be threatened. 
These are linked together into lines of operation that represent the conceptual path connecting an 
actor’s centre of gravity and objectives. Alexander Mattelaer       21 
     
 
supporting operations can perhaps best be understood as perception management: through 
information  operations  (communicating),  PSYOPS  (influencing),  CIMIC  activities  and  an 
extensive  liaison  network  it  would  maximally  foster  a  sense  of  security.  Improving  the 
security situation was felt to be as much a matter of perception as well as of the number of 
security  incidents.  In  any  event,  the  security  situation  would  be  hard  to  measure  in 
quantitative  terms.  For  example,  there  were  no  statistics  available  about  the  security 
situation prior to EUFOR deployment. Even if there had been, one planner remarked, the 
number of reported incidents might very well have risen because the presence of EUFOR 
meant that now there was at least always someone to report to. 
Fast-forwarding  to  the  plan  review  phase  halfway  into  the  operation,  the  operational 
design picture could be complemented by the prospect of a follow-up force under UN flag. 
This would be realised by expanding MINURCAT with a military component post 15 March 
2009.
39 This follow-up force would at least initially rely on European troop contributions 
and  benefit  from  a  separate  planning  cell  in  New  York  (not  unlike  the  planning 
arrangements  for  UNIFIL  II).  At  the  time  of  writing,  it  seemed  likely  the  EUFOR 
contributions from Ireland, France and possibly others would continue to operate under the 
auspices of the expanded MINURCAT operation. In theory, such a UN force would be able to 
adopt a more long-term perspective than EUFOR. In the view of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, a 10 to 15 year timeframe would be required to make progress 
towards achieving a self-sustaining SASE. Over this time horizon, rather than the twelve 
months of EUFOR, it would be possible to have converging lines of operation.  
2.3.2 Concept Development 
From the operational design it was reasonably clear what role EUFOR saw itself playing: the 
main effect to be achieved was to make the local population feel to be more secure. The 
next question was how to do this in practice. In very broad terms, this question was already 
part  of  the  MSO  debate.  MSO  2  foresaw  a  gradual  build-up  of  the  EUFOR  presence 
throughout the area of operations: arrive in the centre (Abéché), then expand south and 
finally north. At the same time it would functionally expand from a monitoring presence to 
a more robust peacekeeping role. MSO 3 aimed for an accelerated, rapid build-up in all 
three zones simultaneously, producing a shock effect affecting the mindset of all players.  
It was clear from the outset, however, that the discussion about deployment timeframes 
would be heavily affected by logistical considerations. The logistical challenges for EUFOR 
have been described in detail elsewhere.
40 The area of operations is located 2,000 km from 
the nearest seaport and 4,450 km from Brussels. Airport facilities in Chad are very limited 
in their throughput capacity while strategic airlift is very expensive and inadequate for 
large cargos. As Host Nation Support in the area of operations is nearly non-existent and 
reliance on local resources (e.g. water) would be highly counter-productive, EUFOR would 
need to autonomously lift in everything it would need. As a result, EUFOR could not escape 
from long transit times (35-45 days): 12-20 days sealift from Europe to Cameroun, 10-15 
days road transport through the Douala corridor to N’Djamena plus an additiona 5-10 days 
by  road  to  Abéché.  The  deployment  that  was  realized  (build-up  to  Initial  Operating 
Capability  in  about  five  weeks)  was  deemed  to  be  close  to  the  maximum  possible. 
Therefore,  all  planning  considerations  were  severely  constrained  by  geography  and 
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logistics. One could vary the weight of the different building blocks of the force and move 
them around a bit, but there were no radically different courses of action available due to 
logistical constraints. 
The idea of varying the thrust of the deployment contained in the MSO discussion was also 
reflected in the debate about possible courses of action. On the one hand there was the 
idea  of  synergy,  which  was  based  on  the  simultaneity  of  deployment  and  maximal  co-
location  between  EUFOR  and  MINURCAT.  On  the  other  hand  there  was  the  idea  of 
situational focus: to concentrate the central effort in the Goz Beida area, as it is the main 
passageway  for  armed  groups,  and  to  have  a  Quick  Reaction  Force  in  Abéché  ready  to 
intervene elsewhere as a sort of mobile fire-brigade whenever required. Eventually a mix of 
these  two  approaches  was  used.  The  area  of  operations  was  divided  into  three  zones, 
North, Centre and South.
41 In order to achieve co-location with MINURCAT, EUFOR bases 
would be deployed to Abéché as Force Headquarters and six forward locations: Bahia, Iriba 
and Guéréda in the north, Forchana and Goz Beida in the centre and Birao in the south. 
Nevertheless, the idea remained that the central effort was to lie around Goz Beida.  
The reasons behind this choice were twofold. On the one hand it was related to geography: 
the  north  being  more  mountainous  and  the  south  having  more  state  boundaries  (in  this 
context  functioning  as  hideouts)  in  its  vicinity  makes  the  Goz  Beida  area  the  most 
attractive passageway for the movement of armed groups. On the other hand the focus on 
Goz Beida was related to the migration problem at hand. The main bulk of camps with 
refugees from Darfur is located in the north. This refugee problem would require a long-
term  solution  to  the  war  in  Darfur.  The  war  in  Darfur  is  a  variable  EUFOR  could  not 
influence. As a consequence, the residual task in the north was limited to deterring attacks 
on the UN and the refugee camps. Towards the south, however, one finds mostly camps for 
internally  displaced  persons.  From  EUFOR’s  perspective,  this  constituted  a  more  fluid 
situation. As it is an indigenous problem, it was felt to be an issue EUFOR would have more 
influence over. As there is at least the possibility of increasing confidence amongst the IDP, 
it offers the most potential for change and hence the best prospects for success. 
As a result, the six forward bases would have slightly diverging roles. The northern area 
(Bahia,  Iriba,  Guéréda)  with  the  main  refugee  presence  would  require  a  permanent 
deterring EUFOR presence for security operations.
42 This can best be understood as police 
action with very potent rules of engagement. Towards the centre (Forchana and especially 
Goz  Beida)  the  mixed  refugee  and  IDP  situation  would  require  a  more  robust  security 
presence.  This  required  more  focussed  engagement:  the  same  deterrence-based  modus 
operandi but more concentrated and specific. The presence in the CAR, an area mostly 
plagued  by  banditry  and  movements  of  armed  groups,  again  required  deterrence  of  a 
mobile, intelligence-driven nature.  
These varying deterrence postures are based on being seen and on showing what the force 
is capable of. ‘Being seen’ is achieved through vigorous patrolling. Such patrols can be both 
short-range (several hours) and long-range (several days). Especially the random pattern of 
                                                 
41 LtGen Patrick Nash Press Conference. 
42 In practice, the presence in the north would be built around Iriba rather than three separate bases. Alexander Mattelaer       23 
     
 
night patrols was deemed to have significant deterrent effect on large-scale criminality.
43 
‘Showing what the force is capable of’ is done through precision-targeted combined joint 
operations. These can be of demonstrative nature in order to increase visibility but can also 
constitute intelligence driven interventions against specific threats or potential incidents. 
These operations would take place in the Forchana and Goz Beida area. They involve up to 
250 personnel from several member states (hence combined or multinational). They would 
also be joint (i.e. inter-services) in involving an air component of 7 to 9 helicopters and a 
ground component of 70 to 80 vehicles. 
Of course, the instruments commanders have at their disposal for achieving their mission 
are intimately bound up with the dimensioning of the entire operation. Together with the 
CONOPS, the Operation Commander prepares a Statement of Requirements. In this process 
a troop-to-task analysis has to be completed: determining what the force needs to do and 
what  type  and  size  of  force  are  required  to  do  so.  While  troop-to-task  analysis  at  the 
tactical level is a fairly straightforward process, it is very difficult at the strategic level. On 
the one hand, the tasks are described in more general terms and allow for more room for 
interpretation.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  little  established  doctrine  available  in  this 
domain.  Some  general  force  sizing  criteria  (such  as  the  number  of  security  personnel 
relative  to  population  size)  have  merit  but  easily  generate  very  large  forces.
44  The 
experience  of  actual  crisis  response  operations  shows  that  such  parameters  often  yield 
impossible requirements. 
EUFOR  planners  did  not  resort  to  force  sizing  parameters  based  on  demography  and 
geographical size. Instead, the Statement of Requirement was based on the force ratio vis-
à-vis potential opposing forces. The general idea was that a contingent in any isolated site 
should not be inferior to a company. The reasoning was that a smaller force would not have 
the critical mass to guarantee its freedom of manoeuvre. Of course it would be possible 
that EUFOR contingents could come under threat from armed groups that are numerically 
far superior. With reconnaissance support, however, it was deemed that such threats could 
be detected beforehand. The contingents, which would in any event have an important 
technological advantage, could then be reinforced by the Quick Reaction Force in Abéché 
and could call in close air support as a last resort option. The Statement of Requirement 
was thus build on the idea that all bases required at the minimum one company and the 
Goz  Beida  camp  two  companies.  This  leads  to  a  total  Statement  of  Requirement  of  10 
companies: 2 in Goz Beida, 5 in total for the other forward bases, 1 as Quick Reaction Force 
in  the  FHQ  in  Abéché  and  another  2  companies  spread  out  over  all  camps  for  force 
protection  purposes.  This  provisional  Statement  of  Requirement  of  ten  companies 
(equivalent  to  just  over  three  battalions)  was  well  in  line  with  the  discussion  over  the 
MSOs.  Apart  from  the  companies,  however,  the  force  would  require  important  enablers 
such as tactical transport capability for increased mobility and reconnaissance assets.  
3.4  Force Generation and EUFOR Capabilities  
While the essence of operational design and military strategy is about how to achieve the 
desired effects, an important preliminary requirement is to obtain the means required to 
be able to do so. In the current security environment, this is by no means self-evident. This 
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clash ensued between EUFOR troops and an unidentified armed group. This event was judged to send 
an important signal that armed robbery is no longer a risk-free enterprise. 
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can  be  explained  at  the  national  level  by  budgetary  constraints  or  an  unwillingness  to 
assume  risk  (these  two  factors  add  up  to  political  will)  and  military  overstretch  (the 
practical  availability  of  capabilities  may  be  blocked  by  other  engagements).  It  is  the 
Operation  Commander  who  needs  to  define  what  he  needs  and  to  ask  the  political 
authorities  of  all  participating  states  to  provide  him  with  the  proper  means.  This 
negotiation  process  over  resources,  which  runs  independently  from  the  operational 
planning itself, is called force generation. It tends to be a highly politicised process where 
the result is invariably a compromise between military needs and political acceptability.
45 
On 8 October the PSC adopted the CONOPS prepared by the Operation Commander. This 
(strategic level) CONOPS was accompanied by a provisional Statement of Requirement. The 
following day, the first formal force generation conference was held. In total, five formal 
force generation conferences (preceded by an informal indicative one) would be needed 
before EUFOR could be launched. This lengthy force generation process is one of the main 
elements in explaining why the operation was up and running only a full ten months after 
the operation had been first suggested. One interviewee described the force generation 
process as “a game of poker”. In the minds of several delegations there seemed to exist an 
expectation  that  France  would  by  default  provide  the  essential  means  for  making  the 
operation a reality. It was France, after all, that had proposed the operation in the first 
place. Furthermore, France lobbied intensively for it, even though the other major ESDP 
players  –  the  UK  and  Germany  –  had  immediately  indicated  they  would  not  participate 
(apart from staff in the OHQ) because of their engagements in Afghanistan. As a result, the 
other member states had only a limited incentive to make sizeable contributions as they 
expected  the  French  to  assume  most  of  the  burden  anyway.  Yet  this  proved  to  be  a 
misperception: the French were well aware that this would become the third military ESDP 
operation in Africa and it was again going to be dominated by French personnel. Both in 
terms of making the ESDP sustainable as a European project as well as averting criticisms of 
neo-colonialism  and  national  interests,  French  dominance  in  the  mission  was  seen  as 
undesirable. At the fifth and last force generation, France grudgingly provided the essential 
assets to be able to start the mission. Nevertheless, the mission was launched without the 
strategic reserve being covered for and with shortfalls in reconnaissance capability.
46  
Initially, 14 member states pledged ground contributions and 22 sent staff contributions to 
the OHQ in Mont Valérien. Eventually, 23 EU member states plus Albania and Croatia at 
some point had personnel in theatre. The major contributions of land forces came from 
France, Ireland and Poland. They took the lead over the multinational battalions, based in 
Forchana, Goz Beida and Iriba, respectively. A French-led Logistics Battalion was based in 
Abéché together with the Special Operation Forces component. The special forces would 
constitute  the  initial  entry  force  and  subsequently  provide  special  reconnaissance  and 
surveillance as well as a rapid reaction capability for emergencies.
47 In terms of air assets 
for reconnaissance and close air support, France provided the fixed wing capacity through 
double-hatting Mirages and unmanned aerial vehicles from its Epervier contingent based in 
N’Djamena. A multinational helicopter pool was established with French, Polish and Irish 
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it “inconceivable” that the French Epervier contingent would not come to the aid of EUFOR if a dire 
situation would occur. 
47  Note  that  Belgium  took  command  of  the  special  forces  component  of  the  operation  from  15 
October 2008 to 15 March 2009. Alexander Mattelaer       25 
     
 
contributions and an offer from Russia (4).
48 These helicopters were crucial for tactical 
airlift, but also for medical evacuation and close fire support, functioning as an important 
force multiplier by providing greater mobility and operational flexibility. 
Another word is in place about the MSOs. The chosen option (MSO 3) initially foresaw four 
battalions. As discussed above, the provisional Statement of Requirement prepared by the 
OHQ was calculated in terms of companies rather than battalions. The OHQ demanded for 
ten companies of which it eventually got nine. This force would be deployed in a sequential 
build-up from the initial entry force in the centre, first towards the south (Goz Beida) and 
then towards the north (Iriba). Although the OHQ did not lower its level of ambition in the 
face of a difficult force generation, the eventual outcome did resemble MSO 2 more than 
MSO 3. While there was pressure to start the deployment sooner rather than later so as to 
allow for a full build-up before the rain season, the launch had to be delayed until the 
mission  essential  requirements  were  fulfilled.  This  put  a  burden  on  the  Operation 
Commander not to take rash decisions, yet not to be overly dogmatic either. Planners seem 
to agree, however, on the thesis that the overall force volume was relatively coherent with 
the  mission  and  that  the  launch  was  not  forced  by  political  pressure.  Thus,  after  the 
fulfilment  of  mission  critical  requirements  and  the  approval  of  the  OPLAN,  the  Council 
could formally launch the operation on 28 January 2008. 
                                                 
48 Pour la petite histoire, it is interesting to observe that the offer of Russian helicopters was already 
announced in the March 2008 but never made concrete. The technical agreement drawn up by Russia 
was only presented mid August 2008, i.e. about one week after the war in Georgia. While it was 
somewhat  embarrassing  that  the  EU  was  discussing  sending  monitors  to  Georgia  to  verify  the 
withdrawal of Russian forces there and simultaneously received an offer for Russian help in Chad, it 
was decided early September that the Russia offer would be accepted in order to increase operational 
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4  EUFOR STRATEGY ANALYSIS: HUMANITARIAN DETERRENCE 
The formal tasks set out in EUFOR’s mandate – contributing to the protection of refugees 
and IDPs, facilitating humanitarian aid and protecting the UN presence – give the operation 
a military-humanitarian character. It amounts to military action not with the intention of 
defeating  an  adversary,  but  to  provide  greater  security  and  enable  humanitarian  work.  
From a planning perspective, the crucial question is how these tasks should be completed. 
The short answer is that the key strategic objective of EUFOR was to contribute to a SASE. 
This  would  be  achieved  tactically  by  vigorous  patrolling,  an  extensive  information 
campaign, liaisoning with all parties on the ground and continuous intelligence work. This 
section discusses in detail how the link between the strategic objective and the action on 
the ground is supposed to function. In other words: how would it for EUFOR be possible to 
generate the intended effects? 
First, a remark is on the nature of the conflict context is due. Considering the imposed 
neutrality and impartiality contained in the UN mandate as well as the CMC and subsequent 
planning documents, it should be clear EUFOR was not intended to engage in any open 
conflict with a distinct adversary. It would be more appropriate to say EUFOR would deploy 
in  a  context  of  ongoing  confrontation  between  the  regime  in  N’Djamena,  various  rebel 
groups with a political agenda, and other armed groups that can be labelled as bandits. 
EUFOR’s  principal  role  was  to  inject  a  modicum  of  stability  in  order  to  alleviate  the 
humanitarian situation. This meant that EUFOR was to position itself as an independent 
actor in the ongoing confrontation. It would not search open conflict, yet it would attempt 
to prevent the occurrence of more violence affecting the humanitarian situation. In other 
words, it would attempt to influence the intentions of other armed actors so that they 
would not resort to the use of force. Deterrence can be understood to be the key concept 
underlying the strategy of this operation.  
The  concept  of  deterrence  embodies  the  idea  that  the  presence  of  a  military  threat 
discourages  potential  adversaries  from  undertaking  any  unwanted  action  out  of  fear  for 
retaliation.
49 It is the threat of military force that changes the cost-benefit calculations of 
possible opponents. It qualifies as a massive psychological operation. The opponents can be 
states as well as non-state actors, or even a population in general. Deterrence is equally a 
conceptual part of any penal and law enforcement system: you should not break the law or 
otherwise  you  are  punished.    Deterrence  often  plays  a  major  role  in  military  crisis 
management.  Apart  from  the  (deterrence-based)  policing  role  intervention  forces 
sometimes fulfil, it remains a widespread idea that external military forces by their mere 
presence constitute a stabilising factor in a conflict environment. Yet deterrence does not 
come  automatically  from  the  presence  of  a  stick.  It  assumes  that  the  opponents  are 
rational actors with cost-benefit calculations that can be changed. In order to do so, the 
actor  who  wishes  to  deter  something  must  clearly  define  what  action  would  not  be 
acceptable. He must communicate his intentions about action and reaction. Furthermore, 
the deterring actor needs to be credible: materially, he needs to possess the means to 
react, and psychologically he needs to show the resolve to retaliate.  
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It  is  not  entirely  straightforward  to  define  in  what  sense  this  is  a  deterrence-based 
operation. This is partly due to the semantic confusion between nuclear and conventional 
deterrence – nuclear deterrence being far better known – and partly due to the inherent 
fuzziness  of  the  political  context:  there  is  no  clear  adversary  to  deter.  At  the  level  of 
political deliberations, the concept received little prominence, if mentioned at all. On a 
more technical level, however, the situation was quite different. In the subsequent reports 
of the UN Secretary-General on the military component of the multidimensional presence in 
Chad, the following is a recurring phrase:  
The  military  component  would  assist  in  protecting  civilians  at  risk, 
facilitate delivery of humanitarian relief, and seek through its presence to 
reduce  tension  and  deter  conflict,  with  a  view  to  establishing  a  more 
secure environment in its area of deployment.
50 
Senior EU military officials extensively used the same discourse. The Chairman of the EUMC 
stated “we cannot underestimate the deterrent effect of the deployment of a very robust 
European force”.
51 In this sense, the use of a deterrence strategy was predetermined from 
the  start  rather  than  a  choice  on  the  side  of  the  Commanders.    As  a  result,  Force 
Commander Ganascia could make the point very clear in public:  
Mon  mandat  est  très  clair.  A  partir  du  moment  où  ces  personnes  [des 
soldats dévoyés, des rebelles ou des bandits] exercent une menace militaire 
sur la population, attaquent les ONG, la Minurcat ou mes hommes, je dois 
agir. Tant qu’ils passent leur chemin, je ne suis pas concerné.
52 
Statements like these fit the deterrence concept perfectly in the sense that they clearly 
set the threshold of what is not acceptable and when action will be taken. Next is the issue 
of credibility: having the means and resolve to retaliate. It is in this light that we can best 
interpret EUFOR’s self-identified strategic centre of gravity. It is remarkable that EUFOR, 
which  operates  with  the  consent  of  the  host  nations  and  with  humanitarian  tasks,  was 
provided by the UN Security Council with a Chapter VII mandate and correspondingly robust 
rules of engagement.
53 Together with the mandate, EUFOR has at its disposal what one 
interviewee labelled “an absolute overkill in firepower”. In this reasoning, the firepower of 
EUFOR’s  modern  weapon  systems  functions  as  a  guarantee  that  the  situation  will  not 
escalate into violence – simply because it is clear who would win the battle. The events on 
the  ground  seem  to  demonstrate  the  effectiveness  of  the  threat.  On  one  particular 
occasion,  for  example,  an  EUFOR  patrol  cornered  an  armed  group  that  had  stolen 
humanitarian aid supplies. Rather than risking confrontation, the goods were returned by 
the robbers with complimentary apologies.  
On  the  ground,  the  deterrence  relies  on  the  simple  presence  of  EUFOR,  the  frequent 
conduct of patrols and targeted joint operations. On a conceptual level, the deterrence 
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51 Gen Henri Bentégeat Press Briefing. 
52 Quoted in Gros-Verheyde 2008. 
53  In  UN  peacekeeping  jargon,  traditional  peacekeeping  (in  the  sense  of  interposition  between 
conflict  parties  after  a  ceasefire  and  /  or  peace  agreement  was  concluded)  is  mandated  under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, whereas peace enforcement (coercive action with a view to maintain or 
restore  international  peace  and  security)  is  mandated  under  Chapter  VII.  The  term  ‘robust 
peacekeeping’ is used for the grey area in between were the use of force is authorised on the tactical 
level  to  deal  with  spoilers.  (UN  2008a).  In  the  case  of  EUFOR,  the  combination  of  mandate  and 
capabilities  can  be  interpreted  as  going  beyond  the  requirements  of  the  ‘robust  peacekeeping’ 
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follows from the presence of EUFOR rather than its mandate. The deterrence is not the 
mission of EUFOR, it is the strategic tool to achieve the objectives of the operation, which 
are all linked to a humanitarian purpose. In this sense, the overall military strategy – in a 
Clausewitzian sense of the word – could be labelled as humanitarian deterrence: the use of 
a  military  threat  to  discourage  spoilers  from  engaging  in  action  that  undermines  the 
security of the unarmed population. Armed groups can fight amongst each other, rebels 
can mount a raid on the presidential palace and government forces can hunt the rebels 
down – on the condition that the civilian population, the refugees and the UN are kept out 
of the fight and are not robbed and preyed upon as a means to sustain operations. 
The independence of action that EUFOR enjoys empowers it with a degree of influence over 
all conflict parties. The rebels are hindered in their freedom of manoeuvre and in some 
respects have to alter their behaviour so as to avoid confrontation. The activities of large-
scale  bandit  groups  are  disrupted,  at  least  to  some  extent.  Finally,  EUFOR  also  has  an 
influence on the governments in the region because EUFOR is present as a witness. Regular 
armed  forces  can  no  longer  cross  the  Chadian-Sudanese  border  without  being  seen  and 
caught on camera. This is deemed to have some deterrent effect in the proxy war with 
regard  to  provocations  along  the  border.  In  this  sense  EUFOR  plays  a  minor  role  in 
influencing the regional balance of power. As soon as it is present on the ground, it cannot 
avoid having an influence of its own (and hence not being neutral in the strictest sense of 
the word). Nonetheless, it can attempt to apply this influence even-handedly (impartially) – 
i.e. according to the interests of the civilian population. 
One can thus observe two paradoxes in the strategy. On the one hand, this strategy – which 
is  designed  to  enable  police  work  and  humanitarian  aid  –  relies  on  very  robust  military 
force. EUFOR can maintain the independence that is necessary for doing its job only by 
being the strongest kid on the playground. Whether this induces the other players to reach 
towards  a  political  settlement  is  another  question.  On  the  other  hand,  any  military 
operation will wield some influence of a more political nature, although it can be hard to 
predict which. While one can do no more than speculate about the ultimate rationale of 
the operation in the minds of key policymakers in European capitals, one could argue that 
an operation with a mandate containing humanitarian tasks will always have a political spill 
over effect from its simple presence. Along this line of thought, even a humanitarian aid 
operation would contribute to some level of containment of the political grievances in the 
region. The possible effect of EUFOR on the politics of the multiple conflicts in the region, 
however, would be hard to predict accurately beforehand. In terms of intentionality, it 
seems  clear  EUFOR’s  immediate  objectives  were  limited  to  deterring  bandits,  enabling 
MINURCAT and endowing the ESDP with more operational experience.  Alexander Mattelaer       29 
     
 
 
5  THE OMNIPRESENCE OF FRICTION 
The godfather of military theory, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, introduced the 
concept of friction, which he defined as the cluster of factors that distinguish real war from 
war on paper. Along this line of thought, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder famously stated 
that  no  plan  ever  survives  the  first  contact  with  the  enemy.  Friction  is  a  fundamental 
characteristic of strategy, and as such mitigates and limits the rationality involved in the 
strategy-making process. It can manifest itself as fundamental uncertainty or the role of 
chance.  Yet  it  can  equally  be  part  of  the  intergovernmental  bargaining  process  or 
organisational procedures. While crisis response operations like EUFOR may be different 
from war-fighting in many respects, they are certainly not less complex. The large number 
of  actors  present  in  theatre  –  EUFOR  had  to  operate  alongside  the  UN  and  deal  with 
governments,  rebel  factions  and  NGOs  alike  –  already  guarantees  as  much.  This  section 
gives an overview of a number of domains in which friction was at play in the strategic 
planning of EUFOR. 
5.1  Planning Assumptions 
In the planning process – at all levels – it is often necessary to make planning assumptions: 
elements you do not know or over which you have no control, but without which you cannot 
plan. Lower levels of planning will generally treat these assumptions as facts. When such an 
assumption turns out to be incorrect, this may have profound implications for the plan in 
general. 
One of the key assumptions made by EUFOR – already on the political level – was that it 
would deploy alongside MINURCAT. This meant there would be a distribution of labour in 
the sense that EUFOR would deter military threats whereas MINURCAT would train police 
for  dealing  with  criminality.  This  assumption  turned  out  to  be  substantially  flawed. 
MINURCAT  was  much  slower  in  getting  on  the  ground  than  EUFOR,  which  delayed  the 
training and deployment of the Chadian police. In September 2008, only 300 Chadian police 
officers  had  been  trained  and  none  were  deployed  on  the  ground.
54  In  the  process  of 
preparing the deployment of EUFOR, however, this was not yet known. It was only once 
EUFOR  arrived  that  it  could  observe  that  the  police  presence  was  not  following  on 
simultaneously. As changing EUFOR’s role in theatre would have required reopening the 
political  process  and  as  logistical  and  geographical  constraints  did  not  allow  for  much 
flexibility,  the  room  for  conceptual  manoeuvre  available  to  EUFOR  was  limited.  This 
explains to a large extent why EUFOR is often qualified in the press as having little effect: 
it may have enabled an environment where police training could be done, but that in itself 
does  not  generate  the  security  that  the  population  and  humanitarian  community  was 
craving for. 
5.2  Interpreting Objectives: What is a SASE?  
Amongst military personnel, the phrase ‘Safe and Secure Environment’ is commonly seen as 
the fuzziest mission one can receive. The concept can be understood to be so wide as to be 
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applicable  to  every  conceivable  contemporary  operation.  As  one  senior  military  officer 
explained: 
What does SASE mean? It presupposes the rule of law, relying on police, 
judiciary  and  border  control  mechanisms.  It  presupposes  economical 
perspectives  to  make  it  sustainable.  In  essence,  it  presupposes  a 
functioning state. But which of these elements can be achieved militarily? 
From a military perspective, a SASE can perhaps best be interpreted as the absence of 
military forces engaging in open conflict. This qualifies as the most basic precondition for 
all other aspects, but only a precondition. However, how to put this into practice brings us 
back to the complexity of conducting a troop-to-task analysis. 
As  stated  in  its  UN  mandate,  EUFOR  was  asked  ‘to  contribute  to  the  protection  of  …’. 
Although one could remark that even the most minimal effort would already qualify, the 
relevant  question  here  is  what  effort  qualifies  as  a  politically  meaningful  contribution. 
While  EUFOR  by  most  standards  would  qualify  as  an  operation  capable  of  making  a 
significant difference, it remains self-evident that expectations on this matter will diverge 
and that the semantic difference between ‘contribute to a SASE’ and ‘ensure a SASE’ will 
be lost on a local population living in desperate conditions. 
5.3  The End-State vs End-Date Debate 
The planning of military operations is traditionally geared towards the achievement of an 
end-state,  i.e.  obtaining  the  situation  upon  which  an  operation  can  be  terminated 
successfully. Planners expect this end-state to be defined prior to the operation itself: the 
idea is that you should know where you want to go before you set out, not simply follow 
your own nose. In traditional combat operations, this end-state tends to be the political 
counterpart  to  the  military  defeat  the  opponent’s  centre  of  gravity.  In  this  conceptual 
framework,  the  entire  operational  design  is  built  upon  lines  of  operation  converging 
towards  the  centre  of  gravity  and  the  end-state.  In  the  EUFOR  operational  design,  this 
analytical  grid  was  not  applicable.  Rather  than  having  an  end-state,  an  end-date  was 
defined. Consequently, the operational design consisted of parallel lines of operation that 
ended in mid-air. The political-strategic logic was built on the (at least initially) uncertain 
assumption that there would be a UN follow-on force with a much longer time horizon.  
The  end-date  concept  has  already  received  ample  criticism.  It  was  also  applied  in  the 
context of the EUFOR RD Congo operation in 2006, which was limited to a duration of four 
months. In the lessons-learned process following this operation, it was already concluded 
that this was highly inadvisable. This begs the question why the EU does it again, thereby 
dismissing  its  own  recommendations.  An  answer  to  this  question  can  be  found  when 
considering the nature of the operations European armed forces currently undertake. These 
operations tend to be timeless: they are seeking a condition that must be maintained until 
a definitive political solution is found.
55 This tends to be a process over which intervention 
forces have little control and which may take decades – or not come at all. In the former 
Yugoslavia, European forces have been engaged since 1992. In Lebanon, UN peacekeepers 
have been active since 1978. Peacekeeping history abounds with examples of operations 
that  go  on  for  years  and  years  without  any  final  agreement  coming  closer.  From  the 
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perspective of the EU, it may well be attractive to provide only an initial entry force – with 
the corresponding fanfare – and subsequently hand over the operation to the UN. This can 
be a cheaper long-term solution, albeit at the risk of overburdening a UN peacekeeping 
system that is already under systemic stress. 
It  is  worthwhile  pondering  what  the  difference  between  an  end-state  and  an  end-date 
means for the making of military strategy. When there is a clear traditional objective to be 
achieved – in the sense of ‘defeat’ or ‘occupy’ – this does not matter very much apart from 
adding time-constraints. When the objective is to maintain a SASE so as to allow for other 
action – be it police training or a political process – the implications are more profound. 
This  objective  can  be  sought  through  humanitarian  deterrence  as  described  above  or 
through  the  simple  physical  defence  of  every  single  element  in  need  of  protection.  In 
reality,  it  will  always  be  a  mix  of  the  two,  but  it  should  be  clear  that  the  deterrence 
posture is more cost-effective than sending a military component along with every single 
police patrol. A strategy of deterrence, however, does not sit comfortably with the idea of 
an end-date. If it is known in advance that the military threat will be removed at a specific 
point in time, the strategic logic crumbles. A spoiler may simply choose to postpone his 
action until the military threat is withdrawn. In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, for example, 
the  very  scenario  that  the  operation  was  intended  to  prevent  –  the  contenders  in  the 
presidential elections resorting to the use of force – materialised with a couple of months 
of delay, after EUFOR RD Congo had left the country. Similarly, the military security that 
EUFOR Tchad / RCA provides through deterrence is unlikely to endure if there is a security 
vacuum after 15 March 2009. In order to be effective, therefore, any UN follow-on force 
should  be  equally  credible  as  a  deterrent.  This  means  political  credibility  as  an 
independent  actor  as  well  as  military  credibility  in  terms  of  having  the  required 
intelligence, mobility and firepower. 
5.4  Credibility as a Security Actor: Synchronising Operational Planning and Force 
Generation 
The issue of credibility is also a matter of political debate in the European context. As a 
strategic centre of gravity, credibility is a remarkably precious asset in what it allows an 
actor to do – it amounts to the idea that threats and promises will generate nearly the 
same effect as the use of force. Nevertheless, it is at the same time a vulnerable asset in 
the sense that it is difficult to build-up but easy to lose. It would be fair to say that the 
military-strategic credibility of EUFOR in the conflict theatre was beyond reasonable doubt. 
Although the force that was generated was small in numbers, all potential opposing forces 
were no match in terms of firepower and technological sophistication. In terms of local 
politics, the course of events so far seems to bear out that EUFOR can indeed follow an 
independent and impartial course. It did not intervene on behalf of Chadian government 
forces when they clashed with rebels. It did intervene when an unidentified armed group 
threatened an IDP camp near Goz Beida, leading to Irish EUFOR forces opening fire. One 
interviewee summed it up as follows: “Déby now accuses us of favouring the rebels while 
the  rebels  accuse  us  of  protecting  Déby.  So  I  think  we  are  doing  well  in  establishing 
ourselves as impartial.” One could of course say that a SASE tends to benefit those in power 
more than the armed opposition, but within the military logic of the operation this was an 
unintentional consequence rather than a conscious intent. As a result, both the political 
and  military  credibility  of  EUFOR,  once  it  was  deployed,  seems  reasonably  assured. 
However, reaching that point that was more problematic. 32    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
While  the  credibility  of  EUFOR  as  an  actor  in  Chad  and  the  CAR  seems  sufficient,  the 
political-strategic debate and the force generation seems to be the Achilles heel of the 
credibility of the ESDP as a vehicle for military crisis-management. To some extent, the 
long-winded  debate  about  the  initiation  phase  can  be  said  to  be  natural  to 
intergovernmental  policy-making.  The  lengthy  force  generation,  however,  confirms  that 
the political will behind the operation was wobbly at best. If it takes six force generation 
conferences to obtain sufficient contributions for a relatively small force, there seems to 
be  a  lack  of  common  interest  among  the  member  states.  This  is  quite  understandable 
considering  the  other  ongoing  military  commitments  of  member  states  (notably 
Afghanistan) and the diverging geopolitical priorities (Russia causing more worries to policy-
makers in eastern Europe than humanitarian disasters in Africa). Nevertheless, a case can 
be made that a lack of political will should become clear from early on in the planning 
process so as not to generate unrealistic expectations.
56 Moreover, it should be noted that 
this does not apply only to the EU: both NATO and the UN suffer from the same problem. 
At the fundamental level, this lack of determination and political priority can be explained 
as follows. Military operations emerging primarily from humanitarian considerations qualify 
as operations of choice rather than necessity.
57 While the conflict in Chad may affect the 
interests  of  some  European  member  states,  there  is  no  direct  threat  to  the  primary 
interests of any of these states, let alone the EU in its entirety. As a result, while few 
policy-makers (or their democratic constituents) will oppose such operations as a matter of 
principle, it is unlikely that these operations will be pursued with great determination. In 
this sense, these operations are more like diplomatic levers in which militaries can gather 
valuable  experience  as  well  as  make  themselves  useful  in  peacetime  rather  than  the 
ultimate raison d’être of the military, which still is to ensure the survival of the society 
from which it springs. This is not to say such operations are not worthwhile or that they 
should be treated as mere exercises – they are often as dangerous and difficult as any. The 
fact  that  they  do  not  spring  from  the  unambiguous  core  interests  of  a  state,  however, 
means that it is far more difficult to generate sufficient political will to bear their cost, in 
particular actual casualties. 
In practical terms, it can be concluded that the current arrangement – where operational 
planning and force generation are concurrent but separate processes – is probably not the 
best  answer  to  flexible  planning  requirements.  The  EUFOR  CMC  was  written  without 
recourse to an official indication of available resources. At the indicative force generation 
conference, very few commitments were made. Nevertheless, planning went ahead. The 
full OPLAN was nearly ready at a time when it was not clear whether the mission critical 
capability requirements could be fulfilled. In other words, the implicit assumption was that 
France  would  provide  the  required  resources  at  all  costs  –  and  this  was  a  dubious 
assumption to make if one aimed to have a sound planning methodology in place. In order 
not to be planning in a vacuum, it is critical to have the operational planning and force 
generation processes work in tandem. Yet the making of military strategy should not be 
simply  resource-driven  either.  The  discussions  about  how  to  achieve  the  objectives  and 
about how to generate the right task force cannot be conducted in two separate rooms. 
According  to  several  interviewees,  the  political-strategic  debate  in  Brussels  was  not  so 
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much about what the operation should achieve as about what it could cost. In such an 
atmosphere, political credibility as a multilateral security actor becomes hard to come by. 
5.5  Activating a Multinational Command and Control Structure 
The  EU  has  three  possible  command  and  control  options  for  planning  and  conducting 
military operations: the EU Cell in SHAPE and the corresponding NATO command structure, 
the Operations Centre in the EUMS and one of the five identified national headquarters (of 
which only three are considered truly operational). As with the previous military operations 
in Africa, the last option was chosen. The French OHQ of Mont Valerien was activated and 
multinationalised  by  augmentees  from  all  participating  member  states.  Although  the 
debate concerning EU command and control arrangements is highly politicised, a number of 
factual observations can be made on the operational level.  
First, feeding all relevant information into an otherwise inactive HQ is a time-consuming 
process for which adequate protocol is often absent. In the case of EUFOR, most of the 
practical  information  required  for  planning  was  present  inside  the  French  Centre  de 
planification et de conduite des opérations, but it could not automatically be shared with 
the  EU  OHQ.  Furthermore,  the  simple  process  of  familiarising  all  augmentees  with  the 
operation  and  learning  to  work  together  requires  time  as  well.  In  the  estimate  of  one 
interviewee, getting a skeleton HQ up to work at full power takes about three months. The 
timely  production  of  the  key  planning  documents  (CONOPS  and  OPLAN)  is  therefore 
critically dependent on an early activation of the HQ.  
Second, the activated OHQ is only a strategic-level HQ, not a complete command structure 
with  adequate  communications  and  information  systems  (CIS).  In  order  to  create  a 
complete communication network, France inserted CIS teams in every EUFOR contingent. In 
other  words,  at  the  tactical  level  all  contingents  internally  relied  on  their  national 
communication systems, but in order to allow communications with the FHQ and higher up 
the chain of command, French equipment was inserted at each critical node. In terms of 
communication, therefore, it could be argued the heart of EUFOR lay in the French CPCO 
rather than in the EU OHQ of Mont Valerien. At one point, a proposal was made to move 
the CIS component completely out of Mont Valerien. As this would effectively dismember 
the  OHQ  structure,  the  proposal  was  turned  down.  It  does  show,  however,  that  there 
existed a certain level of operational dissatisfaction with the present arrangements.  
Third is the issue of continuity. In the planning arrangements used for EUFOR, the initial 
military planning in order to inform the political-strategic process was done at the Council 
Secretariat  and  the  EUMS.  From  September  onwards,  planning  authority  moved  to  Mont 
Valerien. While efforts were made to get liaison officers from the French defence staff to 
the EUMS in Brussels and subsequently from Brussels to the OHQ in Paris, this cannot fully 
prevent a temporary break in planning. Under current arrangements, the Initiating Military 
Directive arrives in the OHQ as if descending from heaven – without the same staff having 
been working on the initiating phase. 34    IES Working Paper  5/2008  
 
     
 
 
 
6  CONCLUSION 
This paper reviewed the political-strategic and military-strategic planning processes of the 
EUFOR  Tchad/RCA  operation  with  the  aim  of  understanding  how  the  operation  was 
intended to generate the desired effects. First and foremost the paper shows that the EU 
has endowed the ESDP with an intricate set of planning procedures largely drawing from 
the NATO model and added a limited civil-military approach to it. This planning system has 
important merits: it is geared towards ensuring continuous political oversight, it structures 
the  planning  discussions  and  it  allows  for  an  incorporation  of  a  wide  range  of  relevant 
factors.  
Regarding the application of this planning framework to the conflict in Chad and the CAR, 
secondly,  the  paper  shows  an  important  split  assessment  of  the  political  and  military 
processes. On the one hand, it makes clear how the EU was able to plan and conduct an 
operation that was highly challenging from a military perspective. On the other hand, it 
illustrated  how  the  difficulty  of  defining  strong  common  European  interests  poses  a 
structural weakness in the political credibility of the ESDP. The political-strategic planning 
of EUFOR cannot be cited as proof of the EU acting in a unified and resolute way. Rather 
than being a problem of procedures, this is a fundamental consequence of the diverging 
political priorities of the member states. 
Thirdly,  the  exploration  of  the  actual  operational  design  and  concept  development  of 
EUFOR illustrates one type of military strategy developed to cope with the question of how 
one can achieve a malleable political objective such as a Safe and Secure Environment. A 
strategy of humanitarian deterrence, if sufficiently credible in terms of military capability 
and  political  intent,  constitutes  an  answer.  The  effect  that  such  a  strategy  enables, 
however,  is  only  of  a  temporary  nature  and  therefore  unlikely  to  change  the  internal 
dynamic of conflict. In other words, as long as the extra time bought by deterrence is not 
put to use in the political domain, using other levers of power, such an operation will not 
have any lasting effect. 
Fourthly and finally, it should be clear that although the strategy of deterrence deserves 
proper  study,  security  challenges  such  as  the  one  in  Chad  pose  problems  for  strategic 
theory in general. Apart from deterrence and direct defence, it is not clear how, given the 
constraint of impartiality, other concepts would allow for the transformation of a military 
effort into political effects. A political conflict can only be addressed directly by military 
means by entering into the conflict itself and choosing sides, with all the risks and hazards 
that this implies.
58 The alternative is to keep the violent political conflict at arm’s length 
from the civilian population by deterrence. Whether one sees this as a nonsensical band-aid 
solution or as a chivalric effort to separate warring parties from civilians is a matter for 
debate. What does seem clear, is that any actor with the ambition of managing conflict 
militarily should brace himself for facing a lengthy and difficult job. 
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